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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPFAT S 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. 
KENNETH NEAL HOLT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
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\pp. - . . «N. .is. .i *. • - ,. ;:;ivmi hi> attorney^ lici/bx rcprie.s u- ihc 
State's Brief of Appellee, dated April I  I, ^H!1), In cloii)r so. Moll reasserts Ilk" nrgiiiiicnls 
and authorities presented in the initial Brief of Appellant, and makes the following 
additional pomi - ym\ u.n 11 u itions. Any argument not specifically addressed herein is not 
\\< aiv eel,, • • ii iiti.il b u d " of Appellant 
In sum, and based upon Ihe cniislilulimul prinupk's .md .nilhonlies srl IIinfIIIi h u v m 
and in the Appellant 's opening brief, Holt requests two types of relief from this Court: (1) 
an order requiring the State to c o m p l y ^ ifh ih: terms o n h e plea barizain in stipulating to a 
•• • '• -.iMi; ,u\i\ At • xicj ; iitii rizing the district 
court to consider a motio . * ' f * r ! 
reduction statute in effect at the umc Huh negotiated ioi, and entered into, In- iea 
bargain with tl K > i ate 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPI JCATION Or i uE 2006 AMENDMEN I TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-3-402, IN A WAY AS TO PRECLUDE RELIEF FROM PROMISES 
MADE AND RELIED UPON iN A CRIMINAL PLEA BARGAIN; 
VIOLATES HOI T 'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AMOUNTS TO 
AN IMPERMISSIBLE EX POST FACTO APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
AND AN IMPERMISSIBI ,E TAW IMPAIRING TIIE OBI JGATION OF 
CONTRACTS, 
A. Due Process And Fundamental Fairness b ' Implii iiliril In Tin Mea 
Bargaining Process, 
i he Suite indicates that the appellant has not made a "due process" argument apart 
from :i. • \ i • • v mpairmeni o contracts claims set forth below. See Brief of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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'• ;te !. . • . ., ,.:,•*., ..»u-,. done so m Uia* ilie general concept of 
fairness and due process permeates llir i\ IK »lt plen bai n,4iinnj> process, 
1
 While the concept of due process and fundamental fairness are inherent in the 
concept of plea bargaining, the appellant discusses "due process*" in more detai 
through-out the "remedies" section of the Brief of Appellant in discussing the remedies 
available ^ *l-*h ''*•• *he State's branch r4 the plea bargain. Sec Brief of Xppeik ;ii at 
26-32. 
3 
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As set liiiili in I hi; appellant'^ opening I >riol. plea bargaining is an essential 
foundation of the criminal msnee svstem. Sec c.v ^f ' t • / ' • • . ' s) - * 5. 
However , the necessary functions of the plea bargaining process "presuppose fairness in 
securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor." Santobello v. Afew York, 404 
I I.S 257, 261 (1971) (emphasis added) • -^equei itl> becau.se a criminal defendant 's 
underlying "contract right" in plea bargaining is eoiislifudoinJk based in Ilit ill le piueess 
guarantee of fundamental fairness, and possibly, the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, the government is righ.tfu.lly held to a, higher standard and a greater 
degree ^*v-p< - ij • •*«. n. ,-nw, ng . . ^ l u r g a m x X-c State v. 
Patience, 944 1\2J j<Sl, 387 (Utah * 
Ai.eoi 'dingh. when a prosecutor fails to uphold the bargain it has made with a 
criminal detenuaia ;hc prosecutor not only violates the contract principles involved, but 
ch le to tl leundei lyii ig constiti ltioi ml i igl its affoi ded a ci ii niiial defendant , the prosecutor 
also violates the fundamental concepts of ii te pi ocess and fail i less in negotiating w ith tl le 
defendant and securing the waiver of many of the defendant's rights as a result of the 
bargain. See Brief of Appellant at 28-29 (quoting State i > Kay \ 71.7 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986) and noting tl lat' the c oi u t s 1 lavel lad to i esoi t to i lotions of f undamental fairness 
under the due process clause to construct some necessin \ iv-. i <-. -t n, : ,<,' 
legitimate interests"). Indeed, a criminal defendant 's right to due process and fundamental 
2See Brief of Anprllanl .il l-l h»: > » o 4 , 
4 
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fairness "construct some necessary protections for the defendants' legitimate interests" 
when entering into plea bargains with state prosecutors. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1302. As 
such, when a state prosecutor breaches a plea bargain, the guarantees of due process and 
fundamental fairness are absolutely implicated, and that breach must be remedied in an 
attempt to make the defendant "whole." What that remedy is, in this case, is the issue 
before this Court. 
B. The Ex Post Facto Clause Is Implicated. 
The State asserts that the 2006 Amendment neither altered the definition of Holt's 
offense, nor increased the penalty for it. Therefore, the State concludes that the Ex Post 
Facto prohibitions are not violated. See Brief of Appellee at 16-23. This Court should 
hold otherwise. 
Despite the State's contentions to the contrary, § 76-3-402 is not a statute 
describing a civil remedy (such as statutes providing for expungement or sex offender 
registration), but is a statute specifically addressing the level of a criminal conviction 
3See Brief of Appellee at 18-22. 
The State's analogy of the reduction statute to expungement provisions is 
unavailing as the policy reasons behind the differing statutes are distinguishable. The 
State asserts that allowing offense reductions for these sex-specific crimes place children 
in danger because, parents or potential employers may not be able to determine a person's 
criminal history if the offense is a misdemeanor. See Brief of Appellee at 22-23. The 
State concludes, therefore, that "eliminating reductions advances public safety by alerting 
the public to the risk of sex offenders in their communities.. .as that risk is reflected by 
the classification that the legislature has assigned to their offenses." Brief of Appellee at 
22 (internal punctuation and quotations omitted). 
To the contrary, however, the level of offense in no way bars employers, 
5 
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and the attendant punishments relating to that degree of conviction. This statute clearly 
allows a defendant facing criminal punishment to seek a "lesser penalty" in one of two 
ways: first, by asking the court to reduce the conviction at the time of sentencing and 
impose penalties accordingly and within the confines of the lesser offense level, or 
second, to wait until the terms of probation have been completed in order to show 
"rehabilitation," so as to justify the reduced level of offense. If the second option is taken, 
"probation" of some form is contemplated in order for a defendant to prove he is worthy 
of the lower level of offense. In this case, the lowered offense would be to a 
misdemeanor, and the ongoing punishments attached to felony convictions would 
dissipate (such as the loss of voting rights, possession of firearms, possible international 
travel, etc.).4 Indeed, "a guilty defendant who is considered worthy of a reduced sentence 
should receive all the advantages that go with such leniency." State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 
238, 244 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting cases). 
neighbors, or others, from determining whether a person has been convicted of a sex 
offense-all they need to do is look for that type of conviction, whether it be a felony or a 
misdemeanor. Indeed, the level of offense plays no role in the State's public safety 
argument, since a conviction still exists on the person's record, and other statutes passed 
by the legislature relating to expungement and sex offender registration determines what 
those level of convictions "mean" and how they may be used. 
4While ongoing penalties and restrictions associated with "felonies" would dissipate, 
those special continuing prohibitions concerning one convicted of specified "sex 
offenses" would not. Cf. State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 244 (Utah App. 1995). In this way, 
the legislature is seemingly able to pass civil type legislation (such as sex offender 
registration) relating to specified sex offenses, whether at the felony or misdemeanor 
level. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The 2006 amendment to §76-3-402, if applied retroactively then, increases the 
magnitude of the punishment for Mr. Holt and other similarly situated defendants who 
have been convicted of sex offenses, and aggravates his offense because it deprives him 
of the opportunity for a reduction of his convictions and attendant consequences, which 
induced him to enter his pleas. Moreover, and as noted above, prior to the amendment, a 
person convicted of a "sex crime" was able to seek a "lesser punishment" by lowering the 
offense level both at the time of sentencing (thus requesting that the court actually 
sentence the defendant to a lesser punishment) or upon the successful completion of the 
terms of probation. In this way, the punishment for the crime at issue has been altered 
since the statutory ability to seek and obtain a lower offense level (again, whether at the 
time of sentencing or thereafter) has been prohibited. This scenario thus directly falls 
under the bans provided by the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions. See U.S. Const. Art. I § 9 cl. 3; Constitution of Utah, Article I § 18; 
State v. Marshall, 81 p.#d 775, 778 (Utah App. 2003). 
C, The "Impairment of Contracts'5 Clause Is Implicated. 
Finally, the State argues that the 2006 Amendment does not violate the 
constitutional "contracts clauses" that prohibits legislation from impairing the obligation 
of contracts. See Brief of Appellee at 23-32. This Court must again reject the State's 
arguments. 
1. The Issue Has Been Properly Briefed. 
7 
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Initially, the "contracts clause" argument set forth in appellant's opening brief 
contained citation to authority, reasoned analysis, and is more than mere "bald assertions" 
leaving the burden of research to the Court. Accord Utah R. App. P. 24; State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (reviewing court entitled to have issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not depository in which appealing party may dump 
burden of argument and research). 
Specifically, the opening Brief of Appellant clearly sets forth the relevant law 
regarding plea bargaining and the application of contract principles to the plea bargaining 
process. See Brief of Appellant at 14-16. Thereafter, the appellant also sets forth the 
relevant legal authority regarding the constitutional prohibitions regarding the "impairing 
the obligations of contracts." See Brief of Appellant at 18-19. Finally, the Brief of 
Appellant provides reasoned analysis as to why the retroactive application of the 2006 
Amendment to § 76-3-402 impermissibly impairs the obligation of contracts, specifically, 
plea bargains. See Brief of Appellant at 21-23 (arguing that the 2006 amendment 
impermissibly impairs the obligations of those plea bargains made between prosecutors 
and defendants prior to the amendment taking effect). The appellant has properly 
developed this argument and has fully complied with his briefing requirement, and this 
Court must reject the State's contention otherwise. See Brief of Appellee at 23-24. 
8 
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2. The Amended Statute Impairs the Obligations and Enforcement 
of Contractually Based Plea Bargains Made Prior to the 
Amendment. 
a. The Contract Between the State and the Appellant has Been 
Impaired. 
The State contends that the constitutional contracts clauses are inapplicable 
because there is a lack of a contract in which to enforce. The State reasons that the 
"defendant had no contract with the court" and therefore, because the "defendant cannot 
show any contract with the court respecting a reduction, he cannot show that the 
amend-ment to section 402 impaired any obligation of contract." Brief of Appellee at 
26-27. 
The State misses the point. Admittedly, there was no binding contract with the 
Court.5 The existing contract at issue occurred between Holt and the State.6 However, the 
amendment to the reduction statute impaired the obligations of the parties to the contract 
by not only seemingly prohibiting the prosecutor from fulfilling his obligations, but by 
prohibiting a court from considering the request, and further, from enforcing the 
prosecutor's obligations under the plea bargain made. See, Cohen v. United States, 593 
5This case does not involve a "binding" plea pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(h). 
6The State acknowledges that a contract existed between the State and Mr. Holt. 
See Brief of Appellee at 30 ("The only agreement defendant had was an agreement with 
the State"). 
9 
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F.2d 766, 772 (6 Cir. 1979) ("touchstone of Santobello is whether the prosecution met 
its commitment and not whether the court would have adopted the government's 
recommendation"). 
In this contract, the State prosecutor promised that he, on behalf of the State of 
Utah, "agrees to a two-level reduction of the offenses from a second degree felony to a 
Class A misdemeanor"-thus, the State agreed that it would stipulate to a reduction in the 
level of offense by two degrees. What the amendment to the reduction statute did, then, 
was impair not only the contractual plea bargain and the associated duties and obligations 
agreed upon between the State prosecutor and the appellant, but it impaired the 
enforcement of that contract by seemingly disallowing a trial court from even considering 
the stipulated motion and agreed upon term of the plea bargain. Consequently, there is a 
contract in this case that has been impermissibly impaired by the amended statute. 
b. Because the Plea Bargain Was Statutorily Authorized When 
Entered, the Appellant's Constitutional Rights Are Paramount 
and Trump the Amended Statutory Provisions. 
The State next asserts that even if there was a contract, it cannot now be enforced 
because the offense reduction is now "illegal." See Brief of Appellee at 27. In making this 
argument, the State dismisses the principle that especially in the criminal realm, a 
defendant's constitutional rights to fairness and due process in the plea bargaining 
process (among others) may trump statutory law. See, e.g., State v. Louis, 645 So.2d 1144, 
1148 (La. 1994) ("Contractual principles may be helpful by analogy in deciding disputes 
10 
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involving plea agreements. However, the criminal defendant's constitutional right to 
fairness may be broader than his or her rights under contract laws. . . .commercial 
contract law can do no more than serve as an analogy or point of departure, since 'plea 
agreements are constitutional contracts.' ") (emphasis added). 
As noted in the opening Brief of Appellant, several courts have noted that in 
enforcing terms of a criminal plea bargain between a defendant and the government, 
specific performance may be ordered by a court even though it is in conflict with the 
statutory law. See Brief of Appellant at 31 (citing cases). This is so because due process 
dictates such a result and a "Defendant's constitutional right[] under plea agreements take 
priority over statutory provisions." State v. Miller, 756 P.2d 122, 123 (Wash. 1988). 
Indeed, the State's position absolutely disregards Mr. Holt's federal and state 
constitutional rights and the paramount importance universally given them by both 
federal and state appellate courts. See, e.g., American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 
P.3d 1235, 1243 (Utah 2006) (the Utah Constitution "is the 'original and supreme will' of 
the citizenry, and 'a superior, paramount law' that fixes the boundaries of power granted 
to the branches of state government"). See also, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 
(1947)("the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are the supreme laws of the 
land, binding alike upon states, courts, and the people, anything in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding") (internal citation omitted); Smith v. 
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 331 (1941)(reversing state court conclusion that habeas corpus 
11 
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relief based on rights guaranteed by federal constitution is unavailable under Nebraska 
law, and stating, "That [federal] Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and 'Upon 
the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and 
enforce every right secured by that Constitution'"); Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 
685 (1877)(federal constitution is supreme law of the land and is as much a part of the 
law of every State as its own local laws); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 348 (1855)("no 
one can deny that the constitution is supreme.. .and the judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding") (internal citation omitted). 
Based upon this well-established foundation that constitutional rights are 
paramount, it is not surprising that legislative enactments are often trumped by an 
individual's constitutional rights. Common examples of this include exceptions to 
statutorily-based privileges, rape shield laws, and other statutory rules applicable to 
preliminary hearings and trials. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974) 
(defendant must be allowed to confront and cross-examine juvenile witness to show bias 
despite state statute prohibiting use of juvenile records and protecting juvenile 
anonymity); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967)(defendant denied Sixth 
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor by state 
statute prohibiting accomplices in same crime from being introduced as witnesses for 
each other); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53-62 (1987) (per se state rule precluding 
12 
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criminal defendant from presenting post-hypnosis testimony violated defendant's 
constitutional right to testify on own behalf). 
Consequently, for Mr. Holt's federal and state due process rights to remain intact, 
the State must be compelled to keep its side of the bargain in this case. The State cannot 
now willfully refuse to keep its promise since due process and fairness trump the 
application of the amended statute in this case. Indeed, based on due process and the 
interests of justice, the State's promise must be fulfilled, and likewise, the trial Court 
must be given the opportunity to enforce that agreement and determine a stipulated 
motion for reduction based upon the law in effect at the time the plea bargain was 
entered. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
7See also, e.g., State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 128 (Hawaii 2003)("when a statutory 
privilege interferes with a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine,.. .the 
witness' statutory privilege must.. .bow to the defendant's constitutional rights"); People 
v. Adamski, 497 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Mich. App. 1993)("It appears well settled as a matter 
of constitutional law that common-law or statutory privileges, even if purportedly 
absolute, may give way when in conflict with the constitutional right of 
cross-examination"); State v. Payton, 954 So.2d 193, 195 (La. App. 2007)("defendant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial may outweigh the State's statutory authority [to enter 
a nolle prosequi and reinstate the charge] under the circumstances of any given case"); 
Commonwealth v. Herrick, 655 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Mass. App. 1995)(based on proper 
showing, "defendant's constitutional right to put forth his full defense outweighs the 
interests underlying the rape-shield statute"); Amos v. Dist. Ct. Mayes County, 814 P.2d 
502 (Okla. Cr. 199l)(statutory provisions cannot deny defendant's access to confidential 
yet exculpatory information); People v. Kowalski, 196 Cal.App.3d 174 (Cal. App. 
1987)(defendant's constitutional right to counsel prevails over statutory right to 
preliminary hearing within ten days). 
13 
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3. The State's Obligation "Vested55 at the Time of the Entry of the 
Plea. 
Finally, the State claims that Mr. Holt had no "vested right" to a reduction of his 
sentence, and as such, the 2006 amendment did not impair any obligation of the plea 
bargain. See Brief of Appellee at 28.8 In doing so, the State defines the point of vestiture 
as the time period wherein Holt could request his reduction-once his probationary terms 
were completed. Holt, on the other hand, looks to the time period in which the actual 
promises and obligations were incurred and where consideration was exchanged-the time 
the plea bargain was entered and accepted by the court. At this point, even though there 
were conditions outstanding, the State's obligation to fulfill its promises had "vested" and 
Holt acted to his detriment in reliance upon those promised obligations. 
In looking at this argument within the context of criminal plea bargains and the 
due process right to fairness that encompasses that context, Holt's right to have the State 
fulfill its obligations did vest at the time he entered into his plea, and under the law all 
parties relied upon. As the United States Supreme Court long ago acknowledged: 
The sound and true rule is, that if the contract, when made, 
was valid by the laws of the State as then expounded by all 
departments of the government, and administered in its courts 
8The State also asserts that Holt had "constructive notice" that the reduction statute 
could be amended, and cites State v. Shipler as authority. See Brief of Appellee at 27-28; 
State v. Shipler, 869, P.2d 968 (Utah App. 1994). The inapplicability of State v. Shipler to 
the current case has been dealt with at length in Holt's opening brief, and will not be 
reiterated herein. See Brief of Appellant at 23-25. 
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of justice, its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by 
any subsequent action of legislation... 
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 206 (1863). 
Moreover, and as noted in the appellant's opening brief, the contracts clauses 
"protect[] contractual obligations in existence at the time the disputed legislation is 
passed." George v. Or en Ltd, & Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 1983); Brief of 
Appellant at 18. The purpose of the contract clause is not to protect future contracts, but 
those contracts existing prior to the enactment of the challenged statute. See Beehive 
Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial Com 'n, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978). As such, the 
contracts clauses prevent "impairment" by a changing of the laws after a contract has 
been made. See id. 
Accordingly, because the State's obligation existed at the time the plea was 
entered, because the State's obligation was based upon the prior offense reduction law, 
and because the trial court accepted the plea under these obligations and under the law 
existing at the time of the plea, the 2006 amendment has improperly impaired the contract 
in this case as it has changed, and eliminated, the contractual obligation of at least one of 
the parties. Moreover, the 2006 amendment also unconstitutionally impaired the plea 
bargain in terms of its enforcement as it now proscribes the trial court's consideration of 
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the obligations incurred by the State previously.9 Such improper application of the 2006 
amendment must be remedied. 
II. HOLT IS ENTITLED TO SOME REMEDY FOR THE STATE'S FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH THE PLEA BARGAIN, INCLUDING SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THE TERMS OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN. 
Based upon the constitutional rights at issue in this case, what Holt initially seeks 
is both specific performance on the part of the State (the State stipulating to a two-level 
reduction) as well as acknowledgment that under these circumstances, the trial court has 
the lawful authority to consider the stipulation for a reduction under the law in effect at 
the time the plea was negotiated, entered, and accepted by the trial court. 
Alternatively, Holt is clearly entitled to some remedy for the State's failure to 
abide by its plea bargain, as suggested in previous briefing. As a last resort, this Court 
must allow Holt to withdraw his plea. Holt requests that he not be forced to undergo post 
conviction procedures even though he did not attempt to withdraw his plea prior to 
sentencing nor attempt to appeal his underlying conviction. Accord Utah Code Ann. 
§77-13-6. An exception should be made since the reason Holt did not seek withdrawal of 
his plea (or appeal of his conviction) is due to his reliance on the State's promises 
9
 The United States Supreme Court notes: 
The obligation of a contract includes every thing within its 
obligatory scope. Among these elements nothing is more 
important than the means of enforcement. This is the breath of 
its vital existence... 
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 600 (1877). 
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pursuant to the plea bargain. The State's failure to abide by the terms of the bargain did 
not occur until well after the time period for a plea withdrawal. Accordingly, due to the 
State's breach of the plea bargain and because this breach occurred through no fault of 
Holt, one remedy, withdrawal of the plea, should be considered and ordered, if this Court 
finds it applicable, despite the timing of the breach. Cf State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah 
App. 2004 ) (discussing whether proper remedy for breach of plea bargain is withdrawal 
of plea or specific performance). 
Again, while Holt asks this Court to consider alternative remedies, such 
alternatives will not, and cannot, make Holt whole for the disregard of his constitutional 
rights and for his good faith reliance on the promises made by the State of Utah. In this 
respect, Holt requests this Court fashion a remedy that does not condone the State's 
disregard. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the points and authorities set forth in the opening 
Brief of Appellant, this Court must order specific performance and compel the State's 
stipulation to a two-level reduction to Holt's offenses of conviction. In doing so, this 
Court must also hold that the district court has the authority to consider and grant the 
two-level reduction under the 402 reduction statute in place at the time Holt negotiated 
his plea bargain and entered his plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June 2009. 
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